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Clark and Chalmers [Analysis 58 (1998) 7] defend the hypothesis of an extended mind,
maintaining that beliefs and other paradigmatic mental states can be implemented outside the
central nervous system or body. Aspects of the problem of language acquisition are con-
sidered in the light of the extended mind hypothesis. Rather than language as typically
understood, the object of study is something called utterance-activity, a term of art intended
to refer to the full range of kinetic and prosodic features of the on-line behaviour of interacting
humans. It is argued that utterance-activity is plausibly regarded as jointly controlled by the
embodied activity of interacting people, and that it contributes to the control of their
behaviour. By means of speciﬁc examples it is suggested that this complex joint control
facilitates easier learning of at least some features of language. This in turn suggests a striking
form of the extended mind, in which infants cognitive powers are augmented by those of the
people with whom they interact.
 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In The Extended Mind Clark and Chalmers (1998) argue for active external-
ism––the view that the mind, or what realises it, need not be conﬁned within either* Corresponding author.
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and line of argument. Among the many things outside the brain and body of any
particular individual are, of course, other brains and bodies. This paper is a pre-
liminary sketch of what might happen when minds extend into one another. The
paper is in two parts––the ﬁrst establishing some theoretical points of reference, the
second being largely descriptive. We note at the outset that what we have written
here is speculative and sometimes loose. It is also, hopefully, suggestive of fruitful
lines of further reﬂection and investigation.
Our sub-title refers to utterance-activity. This is a term of art used, here, to refer
to the full range of kinetic and prosodic features of the on-line behaviour of inter-
acting humans. Utterance-activity sometimes includes what are usually regarded as
words and strings of words, but need not. We regard utterance-activity as at least as
good an object of scientiﬁc interest in its own right as language traditionally con-
ceived. Further, we regard it as continuous with, and inextricable from, (non-
written) language. We combine this continuity thesis with the developmental claim
that language, as usually understood, develops out of, or is at least partly an elab-
oration of aspects of, utterance-activity. This probably sounds at least slightly
unorthodox: on a more standard conception, anything deserving the name of
(spoken) language is a diﬀerent thing in principle from the rest of behaviour.
One simple argument for the standard conception might point out that to do
justice to our intuition (if we have one) that written and spoken language are in some
fundamental sense the same, we should regard the text-like, or digital, aspects of
utterance-activity as language proper, and the remaining twitches, whoops, smiles,
wavings and so forth as something else.
Our view, in contrast, is that we get to do things with words (and enable words to
do things to us) by means of behaviour in which the wordy and non-wordy are
closely integrated, and by going through a developmental period where we do many
of the things eventually done with words without them. We maintain that utterance-
activity is the arena in which what is standardly regarded as language gets started,
and that both the development and ongoing functioning of word-based language are
made needlessly mysterious if utterance-activity is sidelined.
We anticipate at least two major objections to our continuity proposal. Brieﬂy,
the ﬁrst points out that powerful and sophisticated models of language treat lan-
guage as digital, and suggests that the most likely reason these approaches are so
powerful is that language is in fact digital. If this objection is correct, then what we
are doing is urging a retrograde step, where apparently secure results are rendered
doubtful. The second objection notes that if utterance-activity includes (as it does)
aﬀective display, then it includes signals that are not arbitrary (e.g. Ekman, 1972),
whereas we all know that language consists of tokens which are conventionally,
arbitrarily, connected up to each other and the world. This second objection asserts
that were throwing our net too wide, and running all the risks attendant on ignoring
an important partition in the data.
We do not propose to argue directly against either objection, merely suggest how
at least one response to each could get started. In the case of the ﬁrst, note that the
power of a theoretical approach is not by itself a compelling argument for the truth
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that planets are point masses does not make it more likely that planets are in
fact point masses, or that they truly lack colours or interesting diﬀerences in mate-
rial composition. What it shows is that you can get a lot done by treating them that
way.
In the case of the second objection, we note that what counts as arbitrary is a
matter of degree, and partly dependent on theoretical perspective. 1 We, now, cannot
do much about the association between, say, smiling and feeling good. Plausibly,
natural selection could have latched on to some diﬀerent patterns of facial motion
and gone on to build connections between those and social and aﬀective states. So
smiling could be non-arbitrary to us, but arbitrary from the perspective of one
interested in the evolution of patterns of aﬀective signalling in humans. Even sup-
posedly paradigmatic examples of the arbitrary baptism of some referent with a
neologism are, of course, constrained by contextual considerations such as what
words are already taken, what phonemes are available to the community in ques-
tion, what phonetic transitions are easier than others, what the neologism might
sound like, etc.
The insistence on viewing language as a formal system of arbitrary elements
involves playing up what we call the abstraction-amenable aspects of language at
the expense of others. One particularly famous instance of this tendency to focus on
the abstraction-amenable, or digital, aspects of language is, of course, Turings
(1950) proposal for an empirical reformulation of the question can machines think?
Turing regarded it as a virtue of his approach that it had the advantage of drawing a
fairly sharp line between the physical and the intellectual capacities of a man. We
regard it as a competing virtue of our focus on utterance-activity that it demands
attending to bodies and environments. By making utterance-activity central, we are
not eschewing abstraction and theory. 2 Rather, at least provisionally, we are sus-
pending commitment to the view that there is a theoretically well-motivated gulf
separating language proper from other aspects of behaviour.
The supposed gulf between language proper and the rest of behaviour ﬁnds a
suggestive analogue in Clarks work. Describing that gulf will help us get more
speciﬁc about the kind of extended-mind thesis we are going to sketch.2. A tale of two Clarks
We detect two quite strikingly diﬀerent registers or moods in Clark (1997). On the
one hand there is a line of thinking focused on embodied, and typically mobile,1 If some form of determinism is true, then from at least one perspective (i.e. that of the right
deterministic theory) all relations between signs, other signs and things are no more arbitrary than, for
example, the distribution of volcanoes.
2 In Cowley and Spurrett (2003) we criticise Taylor (in Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1998) for reacting to
what he sees as the failure of traditional linguistics by suggesting that we relax our demands for (scientiﬁc)
knowledge, partly by means of some Wittgensteinian therapy.
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traditional expectations concerning the inner character of cognition fail to capture
the manifest cognitive properties of both living systems and eﬀective engineered ones.
On the other hand there are arguments and surveys of evidence centred on the
cognitive advantages of language, which also reject the view that cognitive processes
are exclusively handled by the brain (a view we call cognitive internalism) but which
focuses on higher level functions, paying less attention to embodiment and motion.
The extended mind is an instance of this line of thinking.
When Clark talks about robots, indeed anything that moves, he emphasises, inter
alia, the importance of non-neural resources for controlling locomotion and other
functions, the greater eﬃciency and biological plausibility of subsumption archi-
tectures (Clark, 1997, pp. 13–15; Brooks, 1991) and soft assembly (Clark, 1997, p.
42; Thelen and Smith, 1994) as opposed to control systems with ﬁxed hierarchies
and/or a central executive. In addition, he combines agnosticism about the necessity
of representations with commitment to the view that if there are to be representa-
tions they had better pay their way by being directly capable of serving control
functions, rather than salvaging outmoded intuitions about the representational
nature of thinking (Clark, 1997, pp. 149–153). This is one way of thinking about the
extended mind––an image of brains as parts of embodied coalitions.
When he focuses on language, on the other hand, Clark urges us to relinquish the
notion that the primary or only function of language is communication, and instead
think of it as an external public and symbolic collection of resources, the exploitation
of which grants us a range of cognitive advantages. These cognitive advantages
include a capacity for self-stimulation that serves to improve control and perfor-
mance at tasks (Clark, 1997, p. 202), being able to use symbolic systems to augment
memory by using non-neural storage media (Clark, 1997, p. 201), using labels and
symbols to simplify our environments and learning processes (Clark, 1997, p. 201;
Clark and Thornton, 1997), and simplifying various other types of problem solving.
This type of extended mind is hooked up to a range of external symbolic resources;
language, and language-enabled cognition, is highly distributed, but does not seem
especially embodied.
We are thoroughly sympathetic to both of Clarks approaches here. We think that
hes on the right track, or two right tracks, and drawing on the right kinds of re-
search. Nonetheless we think that there is an important set of questions which his
account of language does not touch on, and which we think need to be part of the
type of approach he defends. To see something of what concerns us, consider his
discussion of learning with and without labels (Clark, 1993, pp. 69–112; Clark and
Thornton, 1997). Whether or not you are surprised that labelling can improve
learning eﬃciency, or open up diﬀerent types of learning, these results are only
possible given a system which operates on labels and data at the same time. With an
engineered system which weve built ourselves its no big deal to add symbolic
inputs in the form of labels to the inputs already in place for the raw data, and
adjust the network architecture so that these two streams interact optimally. But
with us, with people that is, and some non-humans, theres a crucial developmental
question: ‘‘How do we get to be able to make use of symbols in the ﬁrst place?’’
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This means that for the purposes of what follows, we will for the most part leave
Clarks account of the advantages of language once you have ‘got’ it, in place. An-
other way of saying what interests us, though, is as follows: Clarks account of
language, in common with much linguistic theorising, emphasises the abstraction-
amenable aspects of language. That is to say that he focuses on labels, signs, sym-
bols and constructions of such elements. But if he is broadly correct about the
advantages, then an answer to the question as to how any cognizer can get to count
something as a symbol at all is needed, and we maintain that part of the answer to
that question is to be found by paying closer attention to how talk works between
people, which is to say drawing on the sorts of ways Clark looks at robots.3. The poverty of the stimulus
A fact indubitably in need of some explanation is that human children typically
acquire facility with language within a few years and with little evidence of eﬀort.
Debates over the correct explanation are partly organised around a fault line be-
tween empiricists defending some version of the view that general learning can ac-
count for language acquisition, and nativists insisting that some language-speciﬁc
innate capacities are essential. Perhaps the most powerful weapon available to the
nativists is the poverty of the stimulus argument, which can be glossed as follows:
It is clearly the case that a wide range of sets of organising principles are con-
sistent with the stimulus or primary data available to human children, and
further that the sub-set of correct principles are not preferable by the stan-
dards of generic criteria for theory choice, such as simplicity. It consequently
seems extraordinarily unlikely that any human child would ever come to be-
have in ways counted as grammatical for their mother tongue (or tongues)
in the event that human children were broadly empiricist learners. Since chil-
dren do come to be regarded as behaving grammatically with such striking reli-
ability, we can conclude that they are not empiricist learners, but rather that
they have language speciﬁc innate cognitive endowments. 3Debates between empiricists and nativists about language acquisition are not, of
course, a series of confrontations between radical tabula rasa empiricists and
comprehensive nativists who see no role for experience or learning at all. Rather,
disagreement concerns, inter alia, questions about the real nature of the stimulus,
what mixture of innate and learned capacities are required to explain the phenom-
ena, when particular types of learning start, the extent to which humans and3 See, e.g. Chomsky (1965, 1967). Laurence and Margolis (2001) is a useful recent and philosophical
review of the poverty of the stimulus argument.
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tions of diﬀerent types of learning.
Although the present paper is not directly concerned with grammar, we may as
well stress that we are not Chomskyan nativists. That said, with respect to our
ontogenetic concerns we are persuaded that a wide range of innate mechanisms and
biases are required to explain the available data. Our wariness of Chomskys brand
of nativism is fuelled by two major considerations.
On the one hand, work by such ﬁgures as Elman (e.g. Elman, 1991;––see also
Clark, 1993) and Christiansen and Chater (in preparation) suggest ways of re-
evaluating the properties of the learning involved in coming to behave grammati-
cally. Elmans work seeks to establish what particular connectionist systems are
capable of learning, given variations in their architecture, properties of the training
data, and the inﬂuence of varying general cognitive capacities. An example of this is
the role of manipulating the capacity of short-term memory in Elman (1991) which
showed that a plausible type of general cognitive maturation could have the same
eﬀects as the kinds of hyper-benevolent structuring of training data otherwise re-
quired to enable a network to converge on optimal generalisations. Christiansen and
Chater, on the other hand, urge a kind of Copernican revolution, in which the vastly
greater rate of change of languages as compared to genotypes is a justiﬁcation for
supposing that, to a signiﬁcant extent, it is languages that are adapted to our cog-
nitive peculiarities and limitations, rather than our cognitive abilities which are
speciﬁcally and genetically optimised for language.
On the other hand, a range of empirical results concerning the cognitive capacities
of non-human animals indicates that many abilities otherwise easily regarded as
being language-speciﬁc adaptations are found in species without language but with
their own versions of utterance-activity. Chinchillas (Kuhl and Miller, 1978) and
cotton-top tamarins (Ramus et al., 2000), 4 for example, perform surprisingly well at
tasks requiring diﬀerent (familiar and unfamiliar) language groups to be distin-
guished from one another––at least as well as human infants of certain ages. 5 To the
extent that monkeys can do this, though, it seems reasonable to suppose that the
powers of discrimination in question come for free as a consequence of capacities
not in any way selected for language.
Equally important, although in diﬀerent ways, are some of the results from ape
language research (ALR), in particular Savage-Rumbaughs Sherman, Austin and
Kanzi (Savage-Rumbaugh, 1986; Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1998). Kanzis compre-
hension is roughly equivalent to that of a two and a half year old human child. His4 This work tested language discrimination (in this case the ability to distinguish Dutch from Japanese)
in both human newborns and cotton-top tamarins. Both types of subject show signiﬁcant powers of
discrimination depending on fairly abstract equivalences rather than simply prosodic features. The authors
conclude that Since tamarins have not evolved to process speech, we in turn infer that at least some
aspects of human speech perception may have built upon pre-existing sensitivities of the primate auditory
system.
5 The work (see also Nazzi et al., 1998) indicates that rather than distinguishing languages per se,
infants distinguish between stress-timed, syllable-timed and mora-timed languages.
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determine how much it is aﬀected by the physical constraints of the lexigram board
system. To be interesting and signiﬁcant ALR research does not need to produce a
non-human ape with levels of ﬂuency comparable to an educated human adult. The
point rather is that every increase in performance is a blow against the view that to
make any headway at all with language requires speciﬁcally human biological
endowments. 6 For our present purposes what is especially notable about Sherman,
Austin and Kanzi is the lexigram board technology used for the research and
training, and, in Kanzis case, an unusual biography and learning history.
First, on lexigram boards, recall that chimpanzees and bonobos have, compa-
red to humans, very limited control over their own vocalisations. Where much
other ape language research turned to manual sign-language, Savage-Rumbaughs
team used physical grids of lexigram symbols, both in the form of ﬁxed keyboards
which triggered recordings of the relevant spoken term, and as folding boards
which could be carried around and used on the move as well as privately by her
subjects (who manifestly did engage in self-directed lexigram activity). These external,
publicly accessible resources clearly allow some of the memory and other demands of
symbolic processing to be handled by non-neural resources, signiﬁcantly augmenting
the cognitive powers of their users (see Cowley and Spurrett, 2003).
Second, and just as importantly, Kanzis learning biography was unusual. Reared
by Matata, a foster mother, he was present during, and apparently uninterested in,
her own laborious trials with lexigram boards. Matata managed to show facility with
only six diﬀerent lexigrams, given 30,000 trials over a period of 2 years (Savage-
Rumbaugh et al., 1998, p. 17). When she was taken away to be bred at another site,
though, Kanzi soon began making use of the lexigram boards to communicate with
human laboratory workers, showing, as Savage-Rumbaugh puts it, that he had been
keeping a secret (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1998, p. 22), concealed by his indiﬀerent
progress in prior trials with the boards. On the day before Matatas departure, he
used the lexigram board on 21 occasions, asking for 3 diﬀerent foods. On the fol-
lowing day, he produced 120 lexigram-acts exploiting 12 diﬀerent symbols (Savage-
Rumbaugh et al., 1998, p. 22), twice what Matata had mastered in two years.
Savage-Rumbaugh claims that the sudden change suggested that what had changed
was not his knowledge but [. . .] his motivation (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1998, p.
22). Consequently ongoing study of Kanzi focussed less on repeated trials, and more
on interactions between him and human laboratory workers. An aspect of this shift
which we regard as especially important is that in the resulting environment there
was a great deal for Kanzi to gain from working out how to manipulate his generally
attentive, co-operative, and often indulgent human companions, and to do so with
increasing sophistication and precision. Kanzi, then, led a life far closer to that of
human infants than most ALR subjects.6 We note that Savage-Rumbaugh herself accepts the poverty of the stimulus argument and then argues
that the genetic similarity between chimpanzees and humans suggests that chimpanzees are likely to have
at least some of the same adaptations for language. We prefer the line suggested here, and in Cowley and
Spurrett (2003).
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gram boards as part of an extended mind, and Kanzis own biography) suggest that
standard features of debates over the poverty of the stimulus should be re-evaluated.
Such debates generally share commitment to the notion that the infant learner is a
solitary epistemologist, attempting to make sense of external data on the basis of
internal processing, and that it does so with a strikingly scholarly disinterest, or a
bare appetite for generalisations. This results in undervaluing or ignoring the ways in
which non-neural resources can augment and transform cognitive capacities, and the
ways in which social interaction can provide both powerful incentives and mediating
structures that support the learning process. If these commitments are conjoined
with the tendency, noted above, to focus on the abstraction-amenable aspects of
language, the result, we argue, is a grievous misconstrual of the nature of the
stimulus and the learning problem, but most strikingly of all, of the nature of the
learner.
In the second part of this paper, we present a largely descriptive account of a
selection of key episodes––one involving an infant and its mother, one with a child
and its father, and one with three interacting adults. We aim, in so doing, to show
what it is possible to say about, and identify in, the behaviour of interacting humans
when unencumbered either by identiﬁcation of language with only its abstraction-
amenable aspects, or by the view of infants and children as disembodied, or solitary,
epistemologists. The re-evaluation of the nature of the learner and of language that
this descriptive work suggests, is a further elaboration of the ways in which minds
can be extended.4. The how question
We call the question which we want to put at centre stage the how question: How
can anything come to count as a symbol? 7 We do not say be a symbol because, like
e.g. Clark (1993), we are wary of many of the associations carried by the notion of
symbols in debates about cognition and language. Any reference to a symbol is too
likely, on our view, to suggest some kind of token with fairly precise individua-
tion criteria, determinate intrinsic syntactic properties, and capacities for being
more or less literally moved around, operated upon, and combined with other
symbols, often in the head. Of course, whatever is in (and around) the head, it is
undeniable that a great deal of what goes on with people can be described in terms of
symbols, and structured arrangements of symbols, as well as rules for operating on
and with symbols. We want to remain tactically agnostic about what actually goes
on under the cognitive hood, so as to try and get a better handle on a particular set of
phenomena that we think would be possible without assuming too much about
symbols.
Put another way, we do not want to start by buying into a conception of
symbols which is too congenial to approaches viewing language largely or com-7 A more general form of our question, without the developmental spin of the version in the main text,
is: How do the apparently symbolic aspects of talk relate to wider utterance-activity?
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those aspects, we maintain, the more diﬃcult it is to see how language could
possibly get started, or, perhaps, how symbols could be grounded (Harnad,
1990).
Recall that utterance-activity embraces both analog (or non-text-like) and non-
arbitrary elements. To balance this permissiveness, it is useful to adopt some way of
conceptualising how aspects of utterance-activity relate to the how question. For
now well use an oﬀ the shelf  solution––the distinctions between iconic, indexical
and symbolic reference due to Pierce (1955), especially as appropriated by Deacon
(1997). Rather than directly defend the distinctions, well simply take them on board
as a taxonomy, leaving aside the empirical question about the extent to which the
speciﬁed categories are occupied, or the taxonomic analysis is a useful or powerful
one.
Iconic reference involves some kind of perceived resemblance, perhaps even to the
extent of failure to distinguish, between two features of the world. Deacon (1997, p.
75) uses a camouﬂaged moth as an example, which is only successfully iconic of tree
bark to the extent that it is not perceptually distinguished from the bark on which it
stands. The iconic relationship is, given the range of ways in which two things might
be said to resemble one another, a relatively weak one.
Indexical reference on the other hand requires some degree of correlation between
two re-identiﬁable types. Again there is a wide range of possible types of correlation,
including spatial adjacency and temporal succession. In order for there to be an
indexical relationship, a perceiver must be able to identify phenomena as instances of
the two types (smoke and ﬁre, say), and note a relationship between them so that, for
example, identiﬁcation of the ﬁrst can lead to anticipation (or production) of the
second.
With symbolic reference, the idea is that (to a signiﬁcant extent conventional)
symbols stand in a distributed network of relationships with one another, where the
positive reference of any symbol is, at least potentially and partly, cashed out in
terms of indexically determined equivalence classes. Symbolic reference is, because of
the importance of horizontal relationships to other symbols, much less hostile to
vagaries of correlation than indexical reference, so the boy who cried wolf!
undermined the indexical value of his utterances, while not changing the symbolic
reference of wolf (Deacon, 1997, p. 82). Symbolic representation also permits the
construction of higher-order types not directly grounded in experience (unicorn)
but which do nonetheless partly ﬁx experiential criteria (looking like a unicorn), and
others (prime number) which would be impossible, or nearly so, to ﬁx in indexical
terms.
Deacons view is that symbolic referential relationships are constructed out of
indexical ones, which in turn are constructed out of iconic ones, so he envisages a
pair of thresholds with characteristic cognitive demands and developmental prob-
lems in crossing them. For our part we are less conﬁdent that the icon, index, symbol
taxonomy need be related to cognition and development in such a way, partly
because were convinced that dispositions to track at least some iconic and indexical
relations are ontogenetically innate (see, Cowley et al., in press). That seems to ﬁt
452 D. Spurrett, S.J. Cowley / Language Sciences 26 (2004) 443–466with, for example, the work of Garcia and Koelling (1966) who studied aversion
responses to diﬀerent stimuli in rats. They showed that rats very easily learned to
associate (a) a noise and light signal with an electric shock, and (b) a distinctive
ﬂavour with (radiation-induced) nausea. In both cases the test populations fairly
quickly acquired an avoidance response to the initial signal. Garcia and Koelling
also showed that the reversed combinations (light and sound followed by nausea,
and distinctive taste followed by a shock) were more diﬃcult for the rats to learn.
The innate mechanism suggested here is a bias in favour of connecting nausea with
something I ate and either no bias at all, or a negative inclination to learn corre-
lations between nausea and ﬂashes and bangs.
According to Deacon (1997, p. 72), the question whether some mark is iconic,
indexical, or symbolic, is not about the intrinsic properties of the mark itself, but is a
question about the system by which it is actively perceived. So a smile might be a
part of some persons being happy (iconic) or it might be an indicator of happiness
(indexical), or even deployed, like Judass kiss, as a conventionalised signal (sym-
bolic). 8 While agreeing with Deacons general point, we note that the diﬀerent types
of reference each have their own peculiar constraints which, to some extent, make a
diﬀerence to what can count as a mark. The word hound cannot be iconic of dogs,
because it cannot be relied upon to be a part of doggy experiences in the same way as
hairiness can. Further, wracking sobs are iconic or indexical of misery in ways that
conventional labels like ‘‘sad’’ cannot be (Frank, 1988), because we do not generally
think anyone can just decide to burst into tears, even though we do think that anyone
can profess deep sadness.
Note also that on Deacons view the distinction between three types of reference
implies a distinction between (at least) three degrees of competence (Deacon, 1997, p.
74). A being which could make use of iconic reference to deal with its environment
may not be able to manage indexical relations, any more than one that has mastered
some indexical relations need be cable of dealing with symbolic ones. The transitions
from iconic to indexical, and from indexical to symbolic, are learning problems, with
their own distinctive demands. Our primary interest here is in these transitions, and
the implied learning problems.
In line with the tale of two Clarks above, we note that Clark himself lacks an
answer to these questions. This is so even though parts of his work are clearly rel-
evant to these transitions, and highlight aspects of them considered from the per-
spective of concept formation, and RR learning, that is learning involving
representational redescription (Clark and Karmiloﬀ-Smith, 1994; Clark, 1993:
especially Chapter 4). As we hope to show, though, other parts of his work not
speciﬁcally concerned with language, but with the demands of robust real-time
embodied responsiveness, help us make more headway with approaching the how
question.8 One of us (Cowley, 2002) has critically engaged with aspects of Deacons account elsewhere, and
accused Deacon of token realism about the neural counterparts of apparently symbolic behaviour.
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Human infants are extraordinarily dependent. They are only able to support their
own heads at around three months, cannot reach until around four months, crawl
until nine, or walk until thirteen. Unlike other primates, they are unable to cling to
their parents in order to be moved around. Almost anything which takes place in
accordance with their needs, or, later, their goals, has to be done for them. For a
being in such a situation there are clearly advantages to be gained from being socially
legible––that is from being visibly hungry, distressed, uncomfortable, happy, and so
forth, when nourishment, comfort, concerned attention, play, etc., are appropriate.
Infants need social relationships in order to survive, and those who take care of
infants, typically kin and paradigmatically mothers, need social relationships in
order to manage their own energy and resource allocation when caring for the
genetic and material investment represented by a child.
The relationships in question are, and have to be, more than simply aﬃliative.While
close mutual interest is undeniably crucial, caregivers have other demands on their
attention, especially when an infant has siblings, or is dealing with severe scarcity. 9
And even without siblings, there are times when no matter what a child seems to want,
it is more important to make it keep quiet, or wait for some other more urgent goal to
be pursued. Infants and caregivers, that is, share an interest in making sense of and to
one another, and, although only partly and contingently, share interests in the outcome
of their relationship. 10 But they cannot interact in symbolic language, since only one
of them is capable of doing so. Symbolic language is an outcome of their communi-
cation-hungry interaction, rather than a resource available to it from the outset.
Other resources are, though, available. These include facial expressions, direction
of gaze, gestures, body-orientation, and prosodic properties of speech, all of which
are powerful media of aﬀective signalling. Caregivers are directly aﬀected and
motivated by displays of infant aﬀect, especially when the infant is their own oﬀ-
spring (e.g. Wiesenfeld and Klorman, 1978). From birth, or very soon after, infants
show interest in faces (e.g. Maurer and Young, 1983), preference for smiling faces
(Easterbrook and Barry, 2000) 11 and evidence of facial imitation (e.g. Meltzoﬀ and9 There is evidence (see Scheper-Hughes, 1985) that under conditions of severe scarcity a combination
of factors relating to the apparent physical health of an infant and its patterns of interaction (including
levels of crying) are signiﬁcant factors in determining levels of care and feeding, possibly determining
which oﬀspring will survive. Mann (1992) found that in the absence of serious scarcity, maternal attention
tended to focus on the more healthy of two pre-term twins, whether or not the less healthy infant was more
responsive, and smiled more.
10 A parent may have other children to which to allocate resources, or may bet on their chances of
success with future oﬀspring, whereas the developing infant has no such options. Haig (1993) documents
the ways in which, during pregnancy, the foetus (which has less interest than the mother in her own other
and possible future oﬀspring than it does in its own life) can operate more like a parasite than an ally,
competing, inter alia, over blood supply, and levels of blood sugar. See also Trivers (1974) on some aspects
of parent–infant conﬂict.
11 This research, with 28 h old infants, showed an appreciable preference for a static and schematic
smile over a frown and a bulls-eye ﬁgure. The infants showed slightly greater interest in a 6 by 6
checkerboard pattern.
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erties of the language they heard most in the muﬄed world of the womb, and a
particular preference for the voice of their mother, which they reliably identify and
prefer to other voices following birth (e.g. DeCasper and Fifer, 1980). Some prosodic
features of infant-directed utterances have been shown to be indicators of approval,
disapproval, etc., in their own way just as universal as facial expressions are indi-
cators of aﬀective state (e.g. Fernald, 1992; Ekman, 1972). 12 Infants across cultures
show early preferences for approval vocalisations over ones whose prosodic char-
acter is associated with disapproval.
Neither parent nor infant seem, then, to have to learn how to get started with
aﬀective interaction. In the terms adopted above, we can say that these capacities for
aﬀective response make possible a set of innate indexical associations, or serve as the
basis for their development. They facilitate the setting up of complex patterns of
behavioural co-ordination forming a basis for ongoing development of ever more
reﬁned interactive behaviour. By the middle of the second month of life, infants and
caregivers begin to engage in interactions often described in terms of mutual de-
light, in ways showing evidence of cultural particularity. Trevarthen (1977) refers to
such episodes in Britain as manifesting spontaneity, vivacity and delight, while
Bateson (1979) describes interactions in Iran as involving delighted, ritualized
courtesy. We might add that our own data concerning Zulu mothers and infants (see
below) includes periods of delighted musical chorusing. Around the third month
interaction between infants and caregivers becomes intensely dialogical, involving
the production of protoconversation (Bateson, 1979) and manifesting what Tre-
varthen (1979, 1998) called intersubjective communication. While caregivers respond
to infant behaviour, striking phenomena arise from how they guide and control the
infants aﬀectively-based activity. Not only does this involve the development of joint
evaluative behaviour but this outcome inﬂuences how they motivate and rationalise
their own behaviour.
For our purposes an especially important feature of this guiding activity is that it
is able to draw on culturally particular expectations concerning appropriate and
inappropriate behaviour. What makes this important is that these expectations are,
to varying extents, culturally speciﬁc, and hence that the particular patterns of
expectation have, unlike the responses to smiling, say, to be learned.
It is clear enough that infants occupy what one might call culturally saturated
environments, in which, for example, the likelihood of an adult allowing an infants
direction of attention to initiate and ﬁx the focus of interactions, is variable. Other
areas of variation include patterns of response to infant distress, where, for example,
in some settings attempts to distract the infant by directing its attention to a visible
object are more likely, whereas in others attempts to comfort or subdue are common.12 Fernald (1992) documents, inter alia, prosodic patterns (found across multiple cultures) indicating
approval, prohibition, comforting, and engaging attention. It is important to note one way in which the
approach we favour departs from hers. We are interested not only in the internal prosodic properties of
utterances, but also in relational properties discernible in ongoing utterance interactions. Our third
example below (Oeu!) is an illustration.
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turation, that is, of behaviour partly shaped by the patterns of interaction prevalent
in their own culturally saturated environment. 13 Our ﬁrst type of example comes
from our own data concerning Zulu infants of between three and four months of age
interacting with their mothers, and suggests an answer to this question.5.1. Thula! (or Shhhhhhh)
As noted above, there are times when a caregiver will want an infant to fall silent,
or in isiZulu to thula. Zulu children are traditionally expected to be less socially
active than contemporary Western children, to initiate fewer interactions, and,
crucially, to show a respectful attitude towards adults. An early manifestation of this
is in behaviours where a mother attempts to make an infant keep quiet, sometimes
saying thula (quiet), njega (no), while simultaneously gesturing, moving towards
or away from the infant, and reacting to details of the infants own behaviour (see
Cowley et al., in press).
At these times the mother regularly leans forward, so that more of the infants
visual ﬁeld is taken up by her face and palms. New vocalisations, and movements or
re-orientations of gaze by the infant, are often nipped in the bud by dominating
vocalisations (sometimes showing prosodic properties indicative of disapproval,
comforting, attention and/or arousal towards the mother herself) from the mother,
sometimes accompanied by increasingly emphatic hand-waving, and even closer
crowding of the infants visual ﬁeld.
While there are distinctive, repeated, elements in many of these episodes, it is
important to note that signiﬁcant portions of the interaction are usually constituted
by inter-subjective downtime where levels of joint co-ordination are low, and that
the interactive game being played is characterised by extreme ﬂexibility, manifest in
the availability of diﬀerent routes to a number of acceptable (to the mother) goal-
states. There are no simple regularities here where infant distress leads to comforting
vocalisations, in turn leading to reduced distress. Rather one sees a rapid alternation
of diﬀerent strategies––comfortings, calls for attention, expressions of disapproval,
with, usually, an overall convergence on a parental goal-state in which the infant is
quiet. Although it is common to draw on analogies with dancing to describe these
interactions, as Stern (1977) noted, boxing also makes an appropriate comparison.
Boxers spend a lot of time feinting and otherwise exploring diﬀerent possible lines of
attack, at the same time detecting and closing oﬀ their opponents explorations.
Actual punches thrown, let alone landed, form a small sub-set of a larger number of
candidate blows which never make it beyond a slight shifting of weight, or re-
orientation of the body.
In spite of this, since our third example below (Oeu!) makes detailed reference to
contingent details of interaction on the ﬂy, for the present we focus speciﬁcally on the13 The contingent patterns need not be cultural: It is well documented that, for example, levels of
maternal depression make speciﬁc and measurable diﬀerences to patterns of aﬀective display and
behaviour in infants and children (Lundy et al., 1997).
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within relatively little time, the particular infant often does thula, at which point it is
generally rewarded with smiling, gentle touching, and other comforting.
At this stage there is no reason to believe that the infant knows what thula or
njega means, or even that it could reliably re-identify the words, let alone produce
or contemplate them, so it is extremely unlikely that the word-based aspects of
maternal utterance-activity provide labels for the infant. We are considering infants
before the stage linguists call babbling, let alone recognisable speech production. It
is not even necessary to suppose that it knows that it is supposed to be quiet when
behaved at in the ways we have just described. We know that the mother wants the
child to be quiet, that this expresses itself in behaviour by the mother, and that the
infant comes to be quiet.
If we examine the mothers behaviour, though, we can make sense of it. She en-
sures that it is diﬃcult for the infant to attend to anything else by crowding its visual
ﬁeld. She rejects active or new behaviours on its part by cutting oﬀ its vocalisations
and movements with dominating signals of her own. She largely restricts approval
signals, including relaxing the crowding, and reducing the magnitude of her ges-
turing, as well as expressing comfort through vocalisation, facial signalling and
touch, to moments when the infant begins to quieten down. Its not particularly
surprising, then, that it does quieten down.
The mothers behaviour includes salient, repeated, features which are apt for
learning. Her patterns of hand gesturing, for example, could at the outset be iconic of
the whole episode including her behaviour and the infants becoming quiet, but,
when repetition allows the gesture to be individuated and recognised in its own right,
go on to become an indexical cue that quietness should follow. The infants responses
then become indexical for the mother of the degree to which the child is co-operative,
well-behaved, or, more plainly, good. Caregiver descriptions of infant behaviour at
these times, manifest either in their explicit vocalisations to the child, including
references to being good, or references to possible disciplinary sanctions such as
kuza baba manje (wheres your father now?) or, in interviews following the video-
taping, show that infant behaviour even at this early age is being classiﬁed in line
with culturally speciﬁc expectations of good and bad behaviour. And a crucial part
of what makes for a good child is responding in ways sensitive to what caregiver
behaviour is actually about, strikingly in controlling episodes such as the one just
described, which make possible the earliest ascriptions of obedience, co-
operativeness and so forth.
These ascriptions are over-interpretations. They are, though, necessary over-
interpretations, in so far as they motivate caregivers to imbue their own behaviour
with regularities manifest regularities in their own behaviour which are then avail-
able as structure in the interactional environment for (learning by) the infant. A
further episode from our data, in this case concerning a child of around four months,
illustrates this point about over-interpretation. In it an infant repeatedly vocalises in
ways which to its mother, at least, are suggestive of its saying up. Each time she says
up?, or you want to go up? and after a few repetitions she lifts the child. Prior to
the lifting, there is little evidence that the child actually wants to be lifted, or that it
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ments in vocal control. When it is lifted, though, it beams widely. Whatever it did
want, if anything, it is now, we suggest, one step closer to ﬁguring out how to behave
in ways that lead to its being lifted up. 14
Still on the subject of lifting, consider the common gesture made around the eighth
month by infants who want to be picked up (that is, who subsequently smile or
otherwise show approval when they are picked up following such a gesture): a simul-
taneous raising, or ﬂapping, of both arms (see Lock, 1991). This gesture is not simply
copied from common adult behaviours. In the termswe are using here it is partly iconic,
in virtue of being a common posture of infants while they are in fact being held up, and
partly indexical, in virtue of being able to stand on its own as an indicator of being up,
as well as being symbolically interpretable as an invitation to lift, or a request to be
lifted. Such gestures are, importantly, serviceable label candidates, in virtue of being
amenable to disembedding from behaviour, and eventually coming under deliberate
control. An infant need not want to be lifted the ﬁrst few times it makes such a gesture,
it has only to be able to notice that the gesture tends to be followed by liftings.
If and when such learning takes place, it does so in the aﬀectively charged envi-
ronment we have brieﬂy described. We want to bring discussion of the current
example to a close by suggesting a way in which these interactions should be
regarded as a further example of how minds can be extended through action. Clark
and Chalmers suggestion is that paradigmatically mental states and processes can be
realised by structures and resources external to the brain. The world beyond the skull
of any individual includes, of course, the skulls and brains of others. If active
externalism motivates the recognition of a cognitive prosthesis such as a ﬁlofax as
part of what realises a mind, then the embodied brain of another can also play that
role. Here, then, is our suggestion: that at times interacting caregiver-infant dyads
are neither one individual nor two, but somewhere in between. At the risk of
sounding sensational and un-PC at the same time, infant brains can be temporarily
colonised by caregivers so as to accelerate learning processes.
If this colonisation does happen, it is made possible by a mixture of aﬀective
coupling through interaction, and other mechanisms, such as gaze-following, for
co-ordinating attention (see, e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1995 for an attempt to specify the
various mechanisms involved). There is ample evidence, some canvassed above, that
the aﬀective state of either mother or infant has an immediate impact, especially
direct in early life, on the aﬀective state of the other, and that aﬀective state itself
generally makes a diﬀerence to the ways in which features of the world are observed
and remembered (Zajonc, 1980, 1984; Bargh, 1990, 1992), 15 as well as shaping14 Papousek (1969) showed that by creating environments in which speciﬁc movements by an infant
could make things happen in those environments, that the infants smiled when they did work out how to
exercise control. This suggests that infants are disposed to derive satisfaction from such discoveries.
15 Zajonc showed that subjects subsequently preferred images which were primed with brief (sub-
conscious) images of smiles to those primed with frowns. Barghs striking research showed, inter alia, that
subjects exposed to sentences containing words suggestive of age tended to walk more slowly after
exposure.
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possible directly to install some piece of know-how in an infant, but it is possible,
some of the time, to direct its attention, modulate its attention and arousal, and
regulate various types of reward, to make sure that it is looking in the right direction,
at the right time, and in the right way, to pick up on a pattern which is there to be
learned. Some of the available patterns are culturally speciﬁc indexical relationships
which caregivers take as symptomatic of how good a particular child is, and which,
by structuring caregiver behaviour, open up to the infant a new world of interaction
opportunities.
The instances of indexical learning we describe also permit the beginning of a kind
of semiotic arms race between infants and caregivers. Once an infant has learned,
for example, that the arms-up gesture can lead to being lifted, it is possible for re-
quests (that is, behaviours taken as requests by others, no matter how they are to the
infant) to be lifted to be acted on, or to be refused. Prior to the construction and
learning of the indexical relationship, this was impossible––a parent would lift a
child when the parent wanted to, or thought it would serve some end. Once it has
been learned, requests can be diﬀerentially responded to, depending on their situ-
ation in patterns of interaction extending through time. Personal and cultural con-
tingencies about infants and parents will co-determine what patterns are formed, and
whether, for example, requested lifting is more likely after relatively quick acquies-
cence to silencing behaviour, or less likely in the period following failure to attend to
objects or events in which a caregiver attempted to arouse interest.
A major shift in the character of this arms race comes with the onset of more
deliberate and ﬁne vocal control on the part of the infant, which brings us to our next
example.5.2. [n~a]/[b=o]
Around the tenth month of life a further striking change in infant interaction is
noticeable. Where before monadic behaviour gave way to dyadic interaction, the
infant now engages the world in a triadic fashion, combining interest in things with
joint behaviour with persons. A striking example is given by the linguist Halliday
(1975), who describes how at 101
2
months his son Nigel came to use his father by
means of vocal behaviour.
Nigel produced two distinctive vocal utterances, which Halliday records as [bø]
and [n~a], and interpreted as, respectively, a request for a favourite toy bird, and a
general give me that demand. To respond to [n~a], in other words, Halliday had to
use what was present in the environment to infer what the child was demanding.
Indeed, at Nigels age, children are likely to be showing early instances of relatively16 Dimberg et al. found that observation of, e.g. smiling faces led to neural and muscular activity
associated with smiling, even when the images were not consciously perceived. Tartter showed that smiling
changes the shape of the human vocal tract, in ways increasing the mean frequency of vocalisations.
Vocalisations with high mean frequencies are generally characteristic of approval, making this a ﬁne
example of both multiple determination and non-arbitrariness.
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additional (and charitable) interpretive resources to bear on the question whether
Nigel, on any two separate occasions, was making the same sound again. By doing
so he, perhaps somewhat more than parents without linguistic training, was lowering
the demands on Nigels behaviour insofar it could be taken as producing labels
which Halliday himself could then go on to take as signiﬁcant. Although the much
younger child taken as asking to be picked up in the episode described above
undoubtedly had less vocal control than Nigel, Hallidays criteria for sameness of
utterance is similar to that parents regarding the successive vocalisations of her child
as attempts to say up. Both cases have in common a movement in the direction of
less multi-modal behaviour (one largely gestural, the other largely vocal), and
towards producing more eﬀective labels.
In the thula case the behaviours we described are likely to be seen as too far from
language to count as relevantly related to it. In the present case we need to guard
against the opposite tendency, that is to regard Nigels various [n~a]s and [bø]s as too
much like mature language. Halliday himself regards the vocalisations as uses of
protowords, 17 and treats them as expressions of relatively well-formed intentions,
perhaps even propositional attitudes, to the eﬀect that Nigel wants the bird, or wants
some other present object. Thibault (2000) for his part, regards the data as evidence
that Nigel has crossed the threshold to indexical reference. We have just seen,
though, how infant responses to attempts to quieten them down can be taken by
caregivers as indicators of how good the child is, and how such ascriptions need not
ﬁnd counterparts in the cognitive world of the infant. Is a similarly deﬂationary
approach possible here?
Clearly it is. Nigel need not initially want the bird, any more than the child just
described need want to be lifted. What is required is that the child be capable of
learning the correlation between some aspect of its own behaviour and the regu-
larities produced by attentive adult responses. Nigel could have just gone [bø] at
some time when he was shortly after pleased to be presented with the bird toy, and
thereafter gone on to learn that [bø]s were reliably followed by bird-givings, and
adult utterances of bird which partly echoed his own vocalisations. (At the same
time Nigel was, of course, acquiring a kind of expertise appropriate to his being in a
situation in which 10 month old children get to order parents about at all!) Indexical
reference on Nigels part can be one product of ongoing interaction, scaﬀolded by
Hallidays production of regularities in the environment, but it need not be the case
that Nigels initial behaviour be so motivated.
There are, though, important diﬀerences between the thula case, and that of [n~a]/
[bø]. Nigel, unlike three month old infants, is capable of behaving in ways which
produce highly salient label candidates, not naturally related to aﬀective states in the
ways that smiling or crying are, and hence amenable to being conventionally asso-
ciated with goals, desires and so forth. At his age Nigel also initiates interactions, and,17 As is often the case (see Bates and Begnini, 1979), these have imperative uses (e.g. up, more). It is
of interest that while laboratory trained apes act similarly, even encultured chimpanzees rarely move
to declarative forms of expression (e.g. dadda gone).
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larities in his vocal behaviour, coupled with his greater tendencies to manifest agency,
mean that Hallidays (likely) overinterpretations will produce speciﬁc opportunities
for Nigel, relevant to his level of maturation, and through his exploitation of these
opportunities, genuine indexical relationships can come to be established.5.3. Oeu!
The discussions of the preceding two examples leave open an interpretation of
what we are saying which we wish to dispel. That interpretation would have it that
what we are describing is a developmental phase, or perhaps series of phases, during
which motor-centric aspects of utterance-activity play an important role because
abstraction-amenable ones are relatively underdeveloped, and that once those are
properly developed, language proper can get down to business. We maintain,
rather, that the full range of aspects of utterance-activity remain in play in all live
human interaction. 18 By way of illustration we take a single example from an epi-
sode involving several interacting adults.
The episode (for more detail see Cowley, 1998) occurred in Italy, and involved a
mother, a father and their adult daughter. In this case, everything begins with Rosa,
the mother, evidently seeking sympathy by claiming to Monica, her (adult) daughter,
that a certain person had been too lazy to cut some pea-poles she had wanted. This
tactic does not succeed in winning Monicas sympathy, and in any event it soon
emerges that the husband/father, Aldo, had in fact cut ﬁfteen poles. Rosa changes
tack, and instead asserts that the problem is that the pea-poles were unsatisfactory,
because they were too long.
Still seeking Monicas sympathy, Rosa now ridicules Aldo by claiming that the
pea-poles were even longer than this room, if not longer (son piu lunghe di questa
camera se non piu). At this point words fail Aldo, and he uses a response cry
(Goﬀman, 1981) not identiﬁable with any word, but amenable to being glossed as
come on, you must be joking, and in the context is clearly legible as an action of
gentle mocking. The vocal gesture in this case is a simple vowel (Oeu) the duration
of which can be stretched to that of a short sentence. What is most striking, though,
is not the internal prosodic properties of Aldos Oeu but its relational properties in
the context of the interaction, and the shared history of the three people present. To
see these features, consider the following ﬁgure (Fig. 1).
Notice that Aldos oeu begins in between Rosas non and piu (not and
longer), and so follows her assertion that the poles were as long as the room, rather18 We would be inclined to argue that this holds, albeit in diﬀerent ways, in the production and
consumption of written texts, even typed ones, as well. Although we do not make this argument here, we
draw some inspiration from Dennetts remark: ‘‘Le Penseurs frown and chin-holding, and the head-
scratchings, mutterings, pacings and doodlings that we idiosyncratically favor, could turn out to be not
just random by-products of conscious thinking, but functional contributors (or the vestigal traces of
earlier, cruder functional contributors) to the laborious disciplining of the brain that has to be
accomplished to turn it into a mature mind’’ (1991: 225).
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Fig. 1. Oeu!
D. Spurrett, S.J. Cowley / Language Sciences 26 (2004) 443–466 461than waiting for the end of her utterance where she adds if not longer. This violates
standard notions of turn-taking while being in keeping with analogies with either
dance or boxing. The beginning of Aldos vocalisation is at an unusually high pitch
for him (about an octave above his usual range), and as he stretches the sound out,
he raises his pitch to the same level as the end of Rosas piu, indexing her utterance.
A little less than half way through Aldos oeu Monica joins in with an oeu of her
own, starting with her pitch a little higher than Aldos, but joining his in harmony
and continuing after he has stopped. Soon after he stops, having run out of breath,
Monica drops her pitch to the top of his usual range, and gives a short laugh (ha!)
at that pitch.
Even without understanding of Italian, the sound recording of this episode makes
sense as a brief period during which two people good naturedly mock a third one,
and do so together. The prosodic details just identiﬁed help make sense of why this
interpretation is so easy. Aldo and Monica are identiﬁably together because their
utterances harmonise, showing a brief allegiance in the same way as bodily orien-
tation shows acceptance or rejection. Their vocalisations are identiﬁably about
Rosas partly because the pitch on which they converge is indexical of the end of her
last utterance, and because Aldos unusual starting pitch is also indexical of her
typical range, rather than his own. Monicas laugh in turn indexes Aldo, again by
being pitched into his normal range. These latter two co-ordinating properties are
probably less noticeable to people who do not know the utterers, but are evidence of
the ways in which prosodic patterns between people with histories of shared intimacy
are modulated by that history, as they can also be by shared cultural experience.
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accomplished doesnt involve even a single standard word.
Similar forms of indexing can be found by looking beyond pitch, and attending to
the ways in which, inter alia, accent, timing, and loudness and various kinds of visible
movement play out in utterance-activity. Although the oeu example just discussed is
very striking, prosodic detail of the same type is all but ubiquitous in utterance-
activity at all ages, and occurs in word-based speech as well as in response cries.6. Conclusion
We opened this paper with the assertion that utterance-activity should be re-
garded as continuous with language, and went on to suggest that approaching our
how question from the perspective of distributed cognition would suggest ways of
re-evaluating the argument from the poverty of the stimulus. Most of the preceding
section is descriptive, rather than argumentative, consisting of an account of how we
are inclined to see a number of examples, and in the ﬁrst two cases, the cognitive and
behavioural transitions of which they might be paradigmatic. A question naturally
arises, regarding how one sympathetic to our way of describing the episodes might
begin to make sense of them.
Here is a somewhat speculative suggestion. In a provocative paper on emotions
Ross and Dumouchel (in press) argue that emotions should be understood as stra-
tegic signals, having the particular eﬀect of encoding preference intensities (which are
more diﬃcult to infer than preference orderings) in ways that, unlike standard
commitment devices, do not have explicitly to be constructed in advance of strategic
interaction. By having preference intensities thus (even if roughly) publicly repre-
sented, otherwise intractable strategic problems can be negotiated, and mutually
uncongenial prisoners-dilemma-type situations, sometimes, avoided. Focussing on
the ﬁrst of these possibilities, the idea is that negotiations between agents who are
mutually aﬀectively legible involve lower computational demands for each agents
individual strategic decision making. As they say:
On our interpretation of the role of the emotions in bargaining, their status as
social conventions enables their expression to be used as early moves in games,
ruling out certain outcomes which might otherwise be thought by other parties
to be possible equilibria. This can be expected to inﬂuence the other partys
choice of strategy so long as the structure of the game is such that the other
party has a choice at all.
Our suggestion is that a similar function is served by emotional signalling in the
epistemic, 19 rather than primarily strategic, interactions between infants and their19 Evans (2002) is a useful recent attempt to clarify what he calls the search hypothesis of emotion, in
which he points out that claims to the eﬀect that emotions solve the frame problem trade on lack of
consensus about what that problem actually is, and also notes that we need a positive account of what
emotion is, in order to empirically investigate whether emotions really help constrain cognitive searches.
D. Spurrett, S.J. Cowley / Language Sciences 26 (2004) 443–466 463caregivers, and in adult conversation. Our descriptions, unlike many accounts of
linguistic and some of strategic phenomena, have not been limited to turn-taking
interactions, and instead have emphasised the ways in which roughly simultaneous
co-ordination of prosodic and aﬀective display takes place, and how such co-
ordinated display can convey signiﬁcant information about relationships. Such
display must convey social information in animals without language, and we contend
that it continues to do so in humans. If this speculation isnt obviously wrong, then it
suggests two lines of development of the notion of the extended mind.
First, especially considering the Oeu! example, it seems unquestionable that
sources of feedback relevant to both Aldos and Monicas control of their own vocal
production, during the period in which they are so strikingly co-ordinated, come
from both their own vocal production, and that of the other. More generally, all of
the types of aﬀective co-ordination we have described involve integration of inputs
from each participants own behaviour and that of others. This is a striking set of
examples of embodied cognition of the sort Clark refers to in the work we have
grouped under the robots category. We hope to have shown something of how this
type of embodied control could be crucial to the functioning of utterance-activity,
and why it merits further empirical investigation.
Second, considering the epistemic pay-oﬀs of the types of embodied co-ordination
we have described, it is clear that the model of the solitary infant epistemologist upon
which much of the poverty of the stimulus debate is based, is seriously in need of
revision. Infants are, in virtue of aﬀective co-ordination, able to function as a kind
of cognitive extension of their own caregivers, who focus their attention, regulate
their levels of arousal, reinforce and retard patterns in their behaviour, and pro-
vide all manner of sources of environmental regularity amenable for infant exploi-
tation. This type of interaction environment permits the construction of socially
indexical relationships, and the disembedding of labels and relationships in ways
amenable to being recognised as symbolic. The types of embodied co-ordination
noted immediately above, that is, permit a particular type of extended mind, in
which infants cognitive powers are augmented by those of the people with whom
they interact.Acknowledgements
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